브레스저널 The Breath Journal

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Transition Finance Guidelines Pass on 'Transition Will' Alone, Without Verification

곽동현·Published 2026-04-14 09:54 KST
All four stages of entry, verification, disclosure and sanctions eased, a gap with international standards
A transition finance system in which all four stages of entry, verification, disclosure and sanctions are left open
A transition finance system in which all four stages of entry, verification, disclosure and sanctions are left open / ⓒ Breath Journal

An analysis finds that the 'transition finance guidelines' the government announced in February 2026 lack mechanisms to verify effectiveness when compared with international standards. The Green Transition Institute released an issue brief on April 13 titled 'Korean Transition Finance, Is It Heading Green?', pointing out that all four stages of entry, verification, disclosure and sanctions are built on eased standards, so that a weak transition plan is not screened out at any stage. Transition finance refers to finance that supplies funds for the low-carbon transition of high-emitting industries such as petrochemicals, steel and power generation. The criticism was raised ahead of K-GX Week, which opens April 20 in Yeosu, South Jeolla Province.

Korea's guidelines present themselves as a 'hybrid model' combining the EU-style activity-based approach and the Japan-style corporate pathway-based approach. The design is to use both the method of defining eligible activities on the basis of the K-Taxonomy and the method of screening the transition strategies companies draw up to decide whether to recognize them. The issue brief judged that core principles are not faithfully implemented in either approach, and that no common standard to ensure substance has been prepared.

The thresholds in the countries used for comparison are set higher. The EU defines transition eligibility through quantitative standards fixed in advance and the do no significant harm (DNSH) principle. Japan set its principles so that all four elements presented by the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) must be met, and the UK evaluates and verifies corporate transition strategies against 15 core criteria. ASEAN operates a system divided into three tiers according to the level of reduction targets, an approach that takes flexibility and credibility together.

In Korea, the eligibility requirements for benefits are met simply by a company declaring its transition will. Submitting a confirmation of adoption of an external pathway or drawing up its own transition plan, meeting just one of the two is enough for eligibility to be recognized. Even when a detailed implementation plan is missing, it is classified as transition will grade 3.

The verification stage is loosely built as well. External third-party verification remains optional with no obligation attached, so transition finance can be provided even when a company submits only its own written pledge. Disclosure is limited to reporting to financial companies and carries no obligation of public release to the market, so there is no channel for outsiders to see which company received how much on what grounds, and what its subsequent reduction pathway is. Sanctions for non-compliance go no further than converting transition finance into ordinary finance or reducing preferential benefits, and even these measures are left to the discretion of financial companies, so no additional financial or legal liability follows.

The institute assessed this as an approach no country has chosen and a design in which flexibility works dominantly. The risk the issue brief identified is 'carbon lock-in'. If the transition finance label is attached to facilities that run for more than 30 years once built, such as LNG power plants, the result can be an extension of the lifespan of emitting facilities in place of reductions.

Signals from the market have also responded to whether verification is present. Japan's GX economic transition plan includes gas and ammonia, but the first GX sovereign bond certified by the Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI) excluded gas and ammonia power generation and secured oversubscription and a greenium. Follow-up bonds issued without certification failed to draw in international investors. The global green bond balance is counted as having grown from $100 billion to $7 trillion over the past 10 years.

The institute put forward two remedies. It called for the authority to establish sector-by-sector reduction roadmaps to be reorganized around the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment or a green transition control tower, and for the standard for transition strategies to be detached from 'NDC first' and designed on the principle of alignment with the Paris Agreement goals. Oh Sun-ah, a researcher on the economic transition team at the Green Transition Institute, pointed to the risk of transition finance being consumed as a formal label and mentioned the government's responsibility to supplement the system.

How the government and financial authorities will answer this criticism has not been settled. Nothing has come to light externally about the actual number of cases and the amounts handled since the guidelines took effect. K-GX Week, which opens in Yeosu in six days, is the earliest stage at which that answer could be heard.

By Kwak Dong-hyun · Breath.Econ

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